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
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Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED

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RESIDENTS OF PRESCOTT VALLEY, TRACY AND TROY DENTON, ET. AL.,

Complainants,

OWEST CORPORATION,

Respondent.

Docket No. T-01051B-02-0535

OWEST CORPORATION'S POST-HEARING BRIEF.

Owest Corporation ("Qwest") hereby submits its post-hearing brief regarding its authority and obligation to provide service to individuals outside of its designated service territory. In July 2002, residents of the Poquito Valley area near Prescott Valley, Arizona, filed complaints against Owest requesting telephone service to their homes. Originally, nine complaints were filed. Of those complaints, only three remain.¹

The sole stated basis for these complaints is that Qwest discriminated against the Complainants pursuant to A.R.S § 40-344. The Complainants assert that Qwest's inadvertent provision of service to two properties within Section 11 forms the basis of this discrimination. The Complainants have no other basis for their claims. To the contrary,

¹ At hearing, the hearing officer dismissed five complaints with prejudice (Susan Bernstein, Kirk and Bobbi Limburg, Arnold and Tamara Fatheree, April and Bryant Peters, and John and Patricia Martin). The primary reason for their dismissal was lack of participation in these proceedings, including failure to appear at hearing. The complaint filed by Sandra Rodr, was dismissed without prejudice since she sent written notification to the Commission stating that she no longer wanted to be involved with the complaint against Qwest.

all of the Complainants testified that they had previously been customers of Qwest and had no problem with the company or the service it provided. TR² 43 (S. Thompson); 102 (E. Thompson); 175 (T. White); 186 (Troy Denton).

In Arizona, a utility has an obligation to serve individuals within its service area. This obligation requires the utility to provide reasonable, adequate and non-discriminatory service to customers seeking service in that service territory. Concomitantly, a utility does not have a right or obligation to serve individuals outside of its defined service territory. See, e.g., James Paul Water Company v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 137 Ariz. 426, 671 P.2d 404 (1983).

One exception to this general rule is when a utility provides service to property that is "contiguous" to its service boundaries. *See* A.R.S. § 40-281. As defined by Staff in this docket, contiguous means adjacent to or touching the utilities boundary line. ³ TR 523. Thus, as Staff testified at hearing, extending service to one or two contiguous properties does not mean that the utility must extend beyond those properties and assume the legally imposed obligations it has to customers in its service area boundaries.

The other exception to the general rule is that although a utility is not obligated or authorized to provide service to individuals outside of its service boundaries to non-contiguous properties, the law requires it to do so in a non-discriminatory manner if the utility willingly and intentionally extends its service to noncontiguous areas. See, e.g., Tonto Creek Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 177 Ariz. 49, 864 P.2d 1081 (App. 1993). In those instances where the utility has demonstrated its intent to provide service, it must provide the service in the same non-discriminatory manner as it does to other areas in its territory. Absent contiguity or discrimination, a utility has no

² "TR" refers to the transcript of the July 14-15, 2003 hearing in this matter.

³ Under Staff's definition, if a utility wanted to serve a parcel of property that bordered its defined service territory, it could do so. That extension, however, would not include additional parcels that bordered the contiguous parcel. In other words, the utility's boundary line remains the same. TR 523-25 (Staff).

authority or obligation to provide service outside its service area.

In this case, Qwest provided service to two addresses that are contiguous to its service boundaries, a right provided to it by Arizona laws. Although authorized to do so, Qwest did not, however, provide that service intentionally or "pick and choose" whom it wanted to serve. Rather, Qwest mistakenly took service orders for two addresses that were outside of its service boundary. This inadvertent provision of service does not create a duty to provide service to the entire area including noncontiguous properties. Without intent, there can be no discrimination, particularly when the company was authorized to provide service where it did. This is even clearer when, as here, the Commission specifically instructed Qwest NOT to disconnect these two services after Qwest discovered the error and notified the Commission. TR 362-63 (Duffy). There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Qwest discriminated against the Complainants in refusing them service. To the contrary, all of evidence presented in this hearing shows that Qwest consistently and uniformly refused service to the Complainants and other persons who are not in Qwest's service territory.

Since the onset of telephone competition, federal and state mandates have pressed Qwest to open its facilities and services to competition while maintaining a high level of service quality to all its existing customers. As a result, Qwest must constantly maintain the precarious balance between market forces that are supposed to drive competition and continued regulation over Qwest as an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"), such as the Service Quality Plan Tariff. Ultimately, any company faces a series of limitations on what it can do, and those limitations are matters of capital and resources. There simply are limits to what can be done.

Just as the Complainants would like to be served by the telephone company of their choice, there undoubtedly are people in other parts of Arizona, many located miles from any existing telephone facilities and service, who would like to be served by carriers they

select. Underserved and unserved areas present important policy issues that should be addressed by the Commission on an industry-wide, state-wide basis and not piecemeal, two or three properties at a time.

Here, the Complainants and others in the Poquito Valley area have wireless service and have an opportunity to obtain wireline service through Midvale Telephone Exchange, Inc. ("Midvale") – an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier ("ILEC") that has offered and applied to provide it. The standard that the Commission must apply in determining whether to issue a new certificate is whether the application for service is in the public interest. Here, the cost would be lower for the Complainants and future customers within Qwest's service territory to grant Midvale's application to serve Section 11.

I. <u>QWEST'S OBLIGATIONS TO SERVE WITHIN ITS SERVICE</u> <u>TERRITORY TO NOT EXTEND TO THE COMPLAINANTS.</u>

Arizona has no Constitutional provision or statute that grants the Commission power to order the extension of a certificate of convenience and necessity (or "CC&N"), sua sponte, where a public service corporation has not manifested an intent or willingness to serve or file an application and, in fact, opposes the extension.⁴ Complainants attempt to show that Qwest violated a "provision of law or any order or rule of the commission..." as a basis for seeking a Commission order requiring Qwest to extend service. A.R.S. § 40-246(A).⁵ The Complainants claim only that Qwest violated A.R.S.

⁴ The Commission has consistently treated Qwest's grandfathered operating rights as the equivalent of CC&N's. For example, it has required Qwest to follow the same procedures when transferring those rights as when certificates are transferred. See, e.g., In re Application of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., Docket No. 9981-E-1051 & U-2063, Decision No. 47161 (July 30, 1976). In this proceeding, Staff referred to A.A.C R14-2-502 (Certificates of Convenience and Necessity for telephone utilities; additions/extensions; abandonments) to explain Qwest's rights and obligations with respect to extending its service territory. See TR 522 (Staff).

The Commission does not have plenary power to regulate public service corporations relative to their certificates of convenience and necessity. Williams v. Pipe Trade Indus. Program of Ariz., 100 Ariz. 14, 19, 409 P.2d 720, 723 (1966); Corp. Comm'n v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 54 Ariz. 159, 176-77, 94 P.2d 443, 450 (1939). With the exception of rate making authority, the Commission's powers are limited and do not exceed those to be derived from a strict construction of the Constitution and implementing statutes. Williams, 100 Ariz. at 17, 409 P.2d at 722; Walker v. DeConcini, 86 Ariz. 143, 150, 341 P.2d 933, 938 (1959).

⁵ It should be noted that A.R.S. § 40-344 by its own terms, and as interpreted by the courts, applies to customers of the utility. It has not been construed to apply to non-customers, such as the Complainants. See Miller v. Salt River

§ 40-344 prohibiting a public service corporation from discriminating in its provision of service. TR 24-25 (S. Thompson).

A.R.S. § 40-282 creates a process whereby a public service corporation applies for a certificate, or an extension thereof, when it wants to provide service to a particular area. (The corresponding rule for telecommunication carriers, A.A.C. R14-2-502, is consistent with the statute.) The boundaries of its CC&N's or service territory define a utility's obligation and authority to serve. That is what service territory and these complaints are about.

In this case, Qwest has undertaken to serve a particular territory, and the Commission regulates Qwest to make certain that the service is reasonable, adequate and non-discriminatory. The Complainants are not part of that territory, and Qwest has never manifested any intent to serve them. To the contrary, it has consistently and repeatedly denied service to these individuals, as it has in all similar cases in the past, because they are outside of Qwest's service area.

A. Owest's Obligations in Providing Service Do Not Include an Obligation to Serve or Extend Service Outside of its Declared Service Boundaries.

In Arizona, public service corporations must assume certain obligations to the public. See Application of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc., 92 Ariz. 373, 377 P.2d 309 (1963). See also, James Paul Water Company v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 137 Ariz. 426, 671 P.2d 404 (1983). One of these obligations is that a public service corporation must provide adequate service to all qualified customers within the scope of its service area. See James Paul Water Co., 137 Ariz. at 429-430. See also Application of Trico, 92 Ariz. at 385. This obligations, in turn, gives the Commission authority to order a public service corporation to extend service to specific individuals or install additional

Valley Water Users' Assoc., 11 Ariz. App. 256, 260, 463 P.2d 840, 844 (1970) (citing Town of Wickenburg v. Sabin, 68 Ariz. 75, 200 P.2d 342 (1948)). However, for the sake of argument and since no discrimination exists, Qwest assumes that the principles constituting the non-discrimination doctrine apply in this case.

facilities (see A.R.S. § 40-331) but only within the company's certificated area. Arizona Corp. Commission v. Tucson Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 67 Ariz. 12, 189 P.2d 907 (1948); Arizona Water Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n., 161 Ariz. 389, 778 P.2d 1285 (App. 1989). A public service corporation is only subject to the orders of the Commission to make such extensions, improvements and betterments as may be required to render adequate service to the communities it serves. Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 3 and A.R.S. § 40-331. See Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Tucson Gas, Electric Light & P. Co., 67 Ariz. 12, 189 P.2d 907 (1948).

The Commission may require a public service corporation, through enforcement proceedings, to obtain a certificate for an area it in fact serves. See A.R.S. § 40-241 et seq. However, the Commission's authority to act is based upon the requirement that a public service corporation must have a certificate to "begin construction of a street, railroad, a line, plant, service or system, or any extension thereof." A.R.S. § 40-281. In other words, the Commission only has jurisdiction to compel certification or enjoin service where a company, through its own willful actions or manifestations of intent, is already serving the public in an area without authorization by way of a certificate of convenience and necessity. See Tonto Creek Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 177 Ariz. 49, 864 P.2d 1081 (App. 1993); Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Old Pueblo Transit Co., 79 Ariz. 327, 289 P.2d 406 (1955); Tucson Gas, Elec. Light & Power v. Trico Elec. Co-op., Inc., 2 Ariz. App. 105, 406 P.2d 740 (App. 1965).

Boundary extensions may also be voluntary when service is provided to properties "contiguous" to the utility's boundaries. See A.A.C. R14-2-502(B). In this proceeding, Staff's definition of "contiguous" means adjacent to or abutting the utility's service boundary. TR 522 (Testimony of Staff). In either instance, the extension is a voluntary one implicating the same obligations and restrictions imposed within the utility's declared service boundary, including the provision of non-discriminatory service. See A.R.S. § 40-

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344. Such an extension, however, does not create an obligation to open service to an entirely new Section. TR 524 (Staff).

Therefore, the only conceivable manner in which this Commission may require Owest to open service to the Complainants and Section 11 would be to show that Owest discriminated against the Complainants in some manner. In this case, there are no circumstances under which the above obligations would require Qwest to provide service to the Complainants or Section 11.

Owest has Never Manifested any Intent to Serve Section 11 or the Complainants.

The Commission may enforce obligations to provide service under a utility's certificate or the equivalent service when the utility has manifested intent to provide service to a particular area. Under James P. Paul, the Commission has authority to delete portions of a carrier's certificate only if it can be shown that the carrier is unwilling or unable to provide the necessary services. James P. Paul, 137 Ariz. at 431, 671 P.2d at 409. It follows that for the Commission to expand a carrier's certificated area, it must be shown that the carrier was willing to provide the necessary services. Owest is not that carrier; Midvale is.

In *Tonto Creek*, the Commission ordered the current operator of a water system to assume a certificate of convenience and necessity which had been issued to other persons. and thus, furnish service to an area that lay outside the boundaries of its original certificate.⁶ The Court upheld the Commission's order because it was supported by evidence that the company was already providing water service to many lots in the transferred area (i.e., it had evidenced an intent to serve the public with that area, as opposed to providing service as a result of an inadvertent error). Id. at 53-54, 864 P.2d at

⁶ Tonto Creek is the only case located where the Commission extended a public service corporation's certificated service area absent the company's application despite its objection. This is consistent with Staff's testimony at hearing that Staff's witness, Del Smith, has not seen a carrier forced to changed its territory boundaries against its will. TR 538 (Staff).

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Specifically, the water provider in *Tonto Creek* was making individualized determinations as to whether to furnish water to persons outside of its certificated area each time an individual resident requested water service. *Id.* at 54, 864 P.2d at 1086. "The [provider] prepared a form letter as a response to people outside of the certificated area who might request service. The letter told them that *if the [provider] decided to furnish water, it would be under the conditions of interior domestic use only, and terminable by the [provider] at any time." <i>Id.* (emphasis added). Unlike Qwest in the present case, the water provider never denied that it was the proper provider of water services to the area, it argued only that it did not have to provide service to every person that applied for it. *Id.* Moreover, the provider's refusal to provide service was not based upon a policy restricting its service area. Rather, it was because the potential new customer would not agree to discriminatory charges.

Qwest has never agreed or applied to provide service to the area in dispute. In this case, the Complainants testified at hearing that Qwest consistently refused to provide service to them each and every time they tried to place an order. The reason for Qwest refusing this service was the same each time: The Complainants were outside of Qwest's service territory. See, e.g., TR 75:23-76:1; 91:24-92:2; 168:13-16; 214:9-215:3; 221:4-7. As will be explained more fully below, Qwest inadvertently provided service to two addresses within Section 11, which was discovered at the onset of these complaints. TR 348; 362 (Duffy). After this discovery, Qwest informed the Commission of its error and was told not to disconnect service to these addresses. TR 363 (Duffy). Not only did Qwest make clear that it had no intention of extending its service to the two addresses in Section 11, but was instructed to continue service regardless. For the Commission to now force Qwest to extend service to the entire Section against its will would be unjust and is contrary to law.

C. Carrier Of Last Resort Obligations Should Be Imposed On All Carriers For The Areas In Which They Are Certified To Provide Service.

If inherent in being a public service corporation is the obligation to provide service to all qualified customers within their certified area, then *all* public service corporations are subject to this requirement. Section 11 is not within Qwest's service boundaries. Therefore, the Commission cannot impose such obligations by forcing Qwest to serve that Section.

Currently, there are several active telecommunication carriers, none of which is Qwest, certified to provide telecommunication services *statewide*. *See* Ex. R-9. Either a public service corporation takes all steps necessary to provide service (i.e. becomes a carrier of last resort) or it loses its certificate. *See James Paul Water Co.*, 137 Ariz. at 430. ("Where a public service corporation holds a certificate for a given area, the public interest requires that that corporation be allowed to retain its certificate until it is unable or unwilling to provide needed service at a reasonable rate"). By failing to require these statewide carriers to serve as carriers of last resort and serve all qualified customers, the Commission would improperly allow them to avoid the obligations imposed by law on *all* public service corporations.⁷

D. The Complainants Already Have Adequate Telephone Service.

Assuming for the sake of argument only that the Commission has authority to require a carrier to provide service to open territory, its authority must of necessity be limited to portions of open territory that are not adequately served and which no carrier has expressed a desire to serve.

⁷ To ignore these principles and require Qwest to serve as a carrier of last resort *outside* of certificated service area would violate A.R.S. § 40-281 et seq. and the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Arizona Constitutions. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394 (1982); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 49 S. Ct. 235 (1929); State v. Beckerman, 168 Ariz. 451, 453, 814 P.2d 1388, 1390 (App. 1991); Caldwell v. Pima Co., 172 Ariz. 352, 355, 837 P.2d 154, 157 (App. 1991); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 78, 688 P.2d 961, 970 (1984).

discussed above.

Several wireless providers serve the Prescott Valley area, and all Complainants currently have wireless service. TR 120 (Alltel, Thompson); 173 (Wireless Internet, White); 203 (Sprint, Dentons). One wireless provider, ALLTEL Communications, Inc. ("Alltel"), applied for Eligible Telecommunication Carrier ("ETC") status on May 19, 2003. Docket No. T-03887A-03-0316. Alltel's application includes Section 11.8 Exhibit R-19 (Application of Alltel).

Under Federal law, in order to obtain ETC status, a provider must provide: local usage; voice grade access to the public switched network; dual-tone, multi-frequency ("DTMF") signaling or its functional equivalent; access to emergency services; access to operator services; access to interexchange service; access to directory assistance; and toll-limitation services for qualified low-income consumers. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a); See also A.A.C. R14-2-1307(C). According to the FCC and the Commission, if Alltel's application is approved, the Complainants' area cannot be classified as "unserved" or unable to receive essential telecommunication services. See FCC 99-204 at ¶ 86, 64 Fed. Reg. 52738 (1999).

Nowhere does the FCC suggest any link between the service status of an area and the existence of a nearby incumbent local exchange carrier or that these services should be provided only by wireline carriers. To the contrary, the FCC has made absolutely clear that the federal Telecommunications Act requires "competitive neutrality." May 1997 Report & Order, FCC 97-157 ¶ 47, 62 Fed. Reg. 32862 (1997). The competitive neutrality standard means that universal service support mechanisms must "neither unfairly advantage nor disadvantage one provider over another, and neither unfairly favor nor disfavor one technology over another." *Id.* In establishing this principle, the FCC specifically rejected arguments that a traditional, non-competitive approach could be

⁸ If Alltel is granted ETC status, it will have the same carrier of last resort obligations as the wireline providers

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appropriate in high-cost rural areas. Id., ¶ 50. Rather, the FCC recognizes the validity of other telecommunications technologies, such as wireless and satellite, in providing services to remote areas such as Section 11.

The same is true under Commission rules. The Commission's classification of "essential facilities or services" include: Termination of local calls; termination of long distance calls; interconnection with E911 and 911 services; access to numbering resources; dedicated channel network access connections; and unbundled loops. Thus, if Alltel, or another wireless carrier, were providing these services to Section 11, the Complainants would have adequate and essential services. Staff interprets its own rules as such, and at hearing, testified that a wireless service qualifies as "telecommunication service" in the same manner as wireline service. TR 515 (Staff). There is no reason to compel Qwest or any other carrier to provide service to the Complainants. They already have cellular service and Midvale has applied to provide wireline service to them.

II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT QWEST DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THE COMPLAINANTS.

A. <u>Qwest Did Not Intentionally Extend Service into Section 11.</u>

The Complainants argue that they have been discriminated against because others in Section 11 have received Qwest service while they were refused service. The Complainants, however, fail to provide any evidence whatsoever that Qwest discriminated by willfully and knowingly providing service outside its service territory. Rather, all evidence presented in this proceeding indicates that Qwest erred in allowing service to be installed at to 10195 N. Poquito Valley Road and 10150 N. Poquito Valley Road (hereinafter referred to as the "Skipper and Lehman properties" respectively). See, e.g., TR 345-348 (Duffy). Moreover, even if Qwest had knowingly provided service to these two addresses outside of its service territory, Commission rules allow for such an extension. See R14-2-502(B); TR 522-24 (Staff). Qwest's only obligation in establishing

that service was to notify the Commission. *Id.* Qwest met this obligation as soon as it discovered its error. The Commission, in turn, instructed Qwest not to disconnect to these two addresses. TR 362-63 (Duffy).

Qwest complied with the applicable rules for extending service, and was specifically told to continue that service. Therefore, it could not be found, as a matter of law, that Qwest was violating any rule, law or decision enabling this Commission to grant the Complainants' requested relief. *See* TR 522; TR 523-24 (Staff's opinion that the Lehman, Skipper and Hernandez properties are contiguous and therefore are subject to extension under A.A.C. R14-2-502). At hearing, Staff, testifying on behalf of the Commission, stated the following:

Q: [S]o I believe what you said is the company isn't discriminating if it is authorized in some form to extend its service to contiguous property, correct?

A: I think that is probably correct, that's correct.

TR 520 (Staff). For the Commission to find otherwise would be arbitrary and capricious.

The Commission itself has no policies, procedures or rules for making a determination as to whether a carrier has "discriminated" or under what circumstances a provider would be in violation of R14-2-502(B). TR 520 (Staff). Commission rules do not provide a definition of "contiguous" in the context of telecommunication providers nor do they provide any guidance with regard to discrimination. Rather, the Commission has made these kinds of determinations on a purely ad hoc basis. It was not until Qwest noticed Staff for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to testify on record as to what the Commission policies and procedures were for determining when a provider can be forced to serve outside of its service boundaries that Qwest was able to find out what standards are being applied by the Commission. According to Staff, this entire complaint turns on the definition of "contiguous". See Exhibit A (an exchange between Qwest and Staff at

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hearing regarding its policies and procedures, or lack thereof, in making determinations of discrimination). As a result, there is simply no way for a carrier, such as Qwest, to know what it is and is not supposed to do.

In cases similar to this, Qwest has consistently maintained that it does not have an obligation to provide service outside of its service area. The Commission also has consistently held that Owest is not required to serve individuals outside its service area even when, as here, mistakes were made that resulted in other individuals receiving service outside of Qwest's territory. See, e.g., Bruce Walker v. U S WEST Communications, Inc., Docket No. E-1051B—96-543, Decision No. 60175; Don B. Miller and Moira L. Miller v. U S WEST Communications, Inc., Docket No. E-1051B-97-130, Bryan & Pam Dellinger v. Owest Corporation, Docket No. T-01051B-01-0354, Decision No. 64828. Staff confirmed that the Commission has never required Qwest or any other provider to involuntarily extend services to customers outside of its service area. TR 538.

Other than the two mistakes made in providing service to two addresses in Section 11, it is clear that in this proceeding Qwest consistently refused to provide service to the Complainants because they were outside of Qwest's service territory. See, e.g., TR 75:23-76:1; 91:24-92:2; 168:13-16; 214:9-215:3; 221:4-7. Qwest's mistaken extension of service does not provide a basis to extend service to Section 11.

Moreover, Qwest is presented with a "Catch-22" situation. On the one hand, Qwest notified the Commission of its inadvertent service to these two addresses. In turn, the Commission instructed Qwest not to disconnect and to continue service indefinitely. On the other hand, the Complainants are now claiming discrimination because these addresses have Qwest service, but they do not. Under these circumstances, a Commission Decision ordering Qwest to serve the Complainants on the basis of discrimination would be arbitrary and capricious.

B. The Lehman and Skipper Properties were Installed in Error.

The first mistake involves the Lehman property at 10150 N. Poquito Valley Road. Qwest's records indicate that it installed the Lehman service in May 1999 after the Lehmans gave Qwest's service representative a neighbor's address at 9750 N. Poquito Valley Road. TR 345-46; 481 (Duffy). Qwest's records do not indicate that the Lehmans provided any additional information, such as Section, Range and Township, when they ordered their service. As made clear at hearing, there was in 1999, and still is to a large degree, no existing address or streets mapped or provided to individuals moving to Section 11 in Poquito Valley. TR 150 (E. Thompson); 436-37 (Duffy); 486-487 (Dougan). Having been unable apparently to locate the Lehman property in Qwest's address system, the customer service representative took the 9750 address information and assumed that the address just above it was within Qwest's service territory. TR 345-47 (Duffy). Qwest's service area ends at 10000 N. Poquito Valley Road (the point at which Section 14, which is inside Qwest's service area, ends and Section 11 begins).

Qwest believes that the service representative then went out of process and unilaterally extended the service boundaries in Qwest's addressing system to a point beyond the 10000 N. Poquito Valley Road mark. TR 346. The order was then processed as any other order. Since there were Qwest facilities in the area and no reason to call an engineer to either verify the location or extend facilities to reach the property, the installation was done without any indication that the property was not inside Qwest's serving territory. *Id.*; TR 480.

The second mistake occurred at the Skipper property at 10195 N. Poquito Valley Road and is directly related to the Lehman installation. ¹⁰ In October of 1999, the first line

⁹ The process that is supposed to be followed, and based on Qwest's records, is followed virtually 100 percent of the time, is that the service representative should have requested that the Lehmans provide Range, Section and Township and Section information so that the property could properly be identified is inside or outside of Qwest's service territory. TR 346 (Duffy).

¹⁰ It is clear from Qwest records and from the Complainants' testimony that service was installed and is being billed

was installed in error. TR 340 (Duffy). A second line was installed in early December 1999 at the same address. *Id.* In reviewing the records and talking to the Qwest employees who actually performed the installations, there was nothing remarkable about these orders. TR 358-59 (Duffy). These orders were simply processed as any other order. *Id.* Based on this information, Qwest determined that the boundary line must have been extended in error at the time of the Lehman installation. TR 348 (Duffy). Thus, when the Skippers called to order service (or anyone else who may have called with a Poquito Valley Road between May 1999 and January 2000), Qwest's internal mapping system showed that they were inside Qwest's service territory. TR 348; 355 (Duffy). Again, no engineer was called to validate that the property was within Qwest's territory or to install necessary facilities to service that property. TR 480 (Dougan).

The Complainants attempt to argue that these individuals who received Qwest service in error gained advantage or were treated differently by Qwest for some reason. See, e.g. TR 25 ("prominent" citizens); TR 177. However, the Qwest engineer responsible for policing the boundary lines testified that: (1) he did not and was unaware of anyone else who had given them special treatment; (2) none of these customers were ever employed by Qwest as contractors or otherwise; (3) neither he nor any other Qwest engineer was called out for these orders; and (4) he specifically told Mr. Lehman, in person, that he was outside of Qwest's service territory and would not be able to get service. TR 4800; 490 (Dougan). In investigating these complaints, Qwest interviewed the individuals who installed the Lehman and Skipper services. TR 358-59 (Duffy). All indicated that they did not know that they were providing service to these addresses in error but were simply following orders as they do for any installation. Id. Even Mr. Thompson testified that as an installer for the company with 29 years of experience, he

to one address even though two homes are receiving the service. TR 105 (S. Thompson). As a result, Qwest has always treated the two parcels as one for ordering and billing purposes. TR 363 (Duffy). Qwest has continued to provide service to this address through transfer of responsibility orders as instructed by Staff.

did not concern himself with whether or not a particular order for installation was at a location within Qwest's service boundaries, particularly if there were available facilities and no other indication that the area might be outside Qwest's boundaries. TR 149 (Thompson). The job of determining whether a potential customer was in or out of territory falls on the service representative or the field engineer. TR 478 (Dougan); 429 (R. Cross). Mr. Thompson, like the individuals who installed the Lehman and Skipper services, did their job, nothing more and nothing less.

These errors were not discovered until late 1999 to early 2000, when Section 11 began receiving a lot of attention. This is due partly to the events involving the Moxley property, where Mr. Thompson broke into the pedestal near his property and re-wired service to his and the Dentons' property, and the fact that the Thompsons had filed an informal complaint against Qwest for service, prompting an internal investigation into Section 11 activities. TR 348 (Duffy); 487 (Dougan). It was during this time that Qwest discovered it was serving properties outside of territory in Section 11. TR 348 (Duffy). At that juncture, Qwest contacted the Commission and notified it of the error. TR 362-63 (Duffy). The Commission told Qwest not to disconnect the Skipper and Lehman services. *Id.* After discovering its mistake, Qwest repaired its mapping system in January 2000 with the proper boundaries on Poquito Valley Road and added new streets, such as Esteem Way, to more clearly indicate that all properties in Section 11 were not inside Qwest's territory. TR 348-51 (Duffy); Exhibit R-13. After the boundary was clarified, anyone calling Qwest for service above 10000 N. Poquito Valley Road would not have been able to receive service. 11

The Lehman and Skipper situations are exceptions. There is a process that is

¹¹ All of the addresses in Section 11 have not been located. For example, only addresses on Esteem Way known to Qwest at that time, such as Thompsons' address, could have been positively identified as outside of Qwest's service territory. TR 350. Other addresses on Esteem Way and other streets, like Stardust Lane, may still be hard for Qwest to identify. Even the U.S. Post Office is unable to deliver mail to these new addresses and streets. TR 150 (E. Thompson).

followed in situations where a customer calls with an address that is not on Qwest's Premis system or, as was the case with the Thompsons and Dentons, where a customer does not yet have an address to provide. In these instances, the sales representative is supposed to ask for the Range, Township and Section number. TR 340-44 (Duffy); 424-26 (Cross). If the customer cannot provide this information, the order is either placed into the system for further investigation or the customer calls back with the information. Depending on what information the sales representative is able to get and what information the Premis system can provide, the customer may be told immediately that they are outside Qwest's service territory. Qwest, however, will error on the side of the customer and relies largely, if not exclusively, on the information that the customer provides. TR 344 (Duffy).

If an address is unavailable or the location unclear, the sales representative will issue an order number for tracking purposes, and the order is sent to Qwest's held-order department or the field engineering office for verification. TR 424-26 (Cross). The service order is also distributed to other departments within Qwest as a matter of course, and a letter is sent to the customer confirming the order and the installation date. TR 404 (Duffy).

C. The Denton and White Orders.

There is confusing testimony from the Dentons and Mr. White regarding their service orders. It appears, however, from their testimony that the process above was followed. When service was actually ordered for the first time by the Dentons, in August 2000, Qwest asked Mrs. Denton for the legal description of her property because no address had been assigned, and the Dentons' street, Esteem Way, had not been recorded on any map. Because she did not have it on-hand, she had to call Qwest back with the information. This call was made after the Dentons decided to place their home in Section 11. See TR 208-210 (Tracy Denton). Shortly thereafter, the Dentons received a call

informing them that they were not in Qwest's service territory and would not be able to get service in Section 11. TR 210-212 (Tracy Denton). Prior to this order, Mrs. Denton testified that she had called to inquire whether it provided service to their property, which they had bought months earlier, even though their closing documents made clear that they would not have telephone service. TR 208 (Tracy Denton). Mrs. Denton testified that, at the time, she could only provide a "parcel" number to identify the location of her property. Id. Qwest, however, cannot locate property over the phone by a parcel number. TR 496 (Dougan). At this time, the Dentons did not yet have an address or a Range, Township and Section number. TR 209 (Tracy Denton). Qwest told Mrs. Denton to call back with more specific information when she had it and was ready to order service. Id. As demonstrated in the documents provided by the Thompsons' realtor, Qwest serves portions of "Poquito Valley". TR 48-49 (S. Thompson). Section 11 is part of Poquito Valley. Id. Section 14 is also part of "Poquito Valley" but is within Qwest's service territory. If, for example, during this initial call Mrs. Denton asked whether Owest served "Poquito Valley" in Arizona, without more specific information she might have received an affirmative answer.¹²

Similar to the Dentons, Mr. White's July 2000 closing documents made clear that no telephone service was available at his property in Section 11. TR 163, 177 (T. White); Exhibit R-6 (Seller's Property Disclosure). When he first called to Qwest to inquire about service in August or September 2000, his property and street, which was originally listed on Esteem Way, was not in Qwest's computer system at all. TR 156 (T. White).

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¹² Neither Qwest nor the Dentons have any notes or records relating to this alleged conversation.

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¹³ Mr. White also testified that he was told to change his address from Esteem Way to North Poquito Valley Road. TR 165 (T. White). A Qwest employee named by Mr. White as party to these conversations, however, testified that Qwest would never request that a customer change his address. TR 423-24 (Cross). Poquito Valley Road, part of which is inside Qwest's service territory, is inside Qwest's service territory. During the time Mr. White called regarding his property on Esteem Way, Esteem Way did not exist on Qwest's map or any other map. TR 156 (T. White); 343 (Duffy). Therefore, it is entirely conceivable that, consistent with Qwest's policies and practices, Qwest's sales or held order representative, asked Mr. White about the nearest street, Poquito Valley Road, and was told that street was on Qwest's address system and inside Qwest's service territory.

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According to Mr. White, Qwest asked him whether any of his neighbors had service to which he responded in the affirmative. TR 162 (T. White). Apparently, there was additional discussion about the utility box that housed Arizona Public Service electric equipment, the general idea being that if there was a utility cross box of some sort was visible to eye then there probably would be Qwest service at that cross box. 14 TR 164-65 (T. White). Based on this information, Mr. White was told that he probably would not have a problem ordering Owest telephone service. *Id*.

It appears that Mr. White actually ordered service from Owest for the first time in December 2000. TR 165 (T. White). It is unclear whether he gave Qwest his Range, Township and Section number, an address on Esteem Way, or the phone numbers and names of his neighbors (presumably the Lehmans and Skippers) during this phone call. TR 156; 170 (T. White). Mr. White, however, was apparently given an installation date of January 24, 2001 on which date a Qwest truck drove to his house then drove away. TR 166 (T. White). Although Owest has no records of any service orders or held-orders under his name, Mr. White testified that he was given a number of installation dates and a number of service orders. 15 TR 157 (T. White). He also testified that he spoke to Owest employee Rick Cross, who was working in Qwest's held-order department (or "CCE") at the time. *Id*.

Depending on exactly what was said during this conversation, it is entirely conceivable that a Qwest sales representative received conflicting information about the Section, Range and Township and a street that did not exist in Qwest's system but had Qwest phone numbers for neighbors in the same Range, Township and Section number and, therefore, attempted to process the order. Pursuant to Qwest's policies and

69 (Duffy).

¹⁴ This cross box or pedestal is most like the one that sits at the corner of Sections 11 and 14, which is wired to

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provide service to residents of Section 14. TR 482 (Dougan).

15 New service order records are not always available if the order is not filled, like it was in this case. However, Qwest is generally able to find what it terms "RTT" tickets for orders like this where the location is unclear. TR 368-

procedures, this order would have then ended up in Qwest's held-orders department so that somebody, in this case Rick Cross, could figure out what was going on in an attempt to get service to this home. TR 424-26 (Cross). It is situations such as this that punctuate the problems that can result when service is extended outside of Qwest's territory on a piecemeal basis.

D. The Hernandez Service is Inside Qwest's Service Territory.

At hearing, Qwest distinguished the Hernandez property from the Skipper and Lehman properties because the Hernandez service terminates within Qwest's service territory. TR 339; 365 (Duffy). The Complainants confirmed this fact. *See* Exhibit C-6. Thus, the Hernandez property is not a property being served outside of Qwest's service territory.

Qwest also distinguished the actual installation of the Hernandez service from the installation that was done by Mr. Thompson with respect to the Moxley residence. Mr. Thompson broke into Qwest's property (the pedestal) and re-wired the lines so that he and the Dentons could have service. TR 142 (E. Thompson). He did this without Qwest's approval or supervision and after he had retired from the company. TR 143; 152 (E. Thompson). Whether or not a person named "Jason" spoke to Mrs. Thompson or Mrs. Denton regarding the Moxley installation is irrelevant. Mr. Thompson's actions were illegal. He was a 29-year employee of the company and did installations and repairs during that entire time. TR 132 (E. Thompson). In other words, he knew what he was doing and did not need someone in Qwest's sales office to tell him how or what he could

¹⁶ The Hernandez's own two adjacent parcels of property. One is within Qwest's service area, Section 14, and one is in Section 11 and borders Qwest's service territory. Qwest service terminates at the Hernandez property within Section 14.

¹⁷ Qwest records indicate that Mrs. Denton called Qwest to order service at the Moxley address. There is no indication that Mrs. Thompson called regarding the Moxley property. TR 379-80 (Duffy); Exhibit R-16. In addition, Mrs. Thompson also testified that Mr. Thompson made all of the calls to Qwest regarding service because he had to in order for them to receive the service concessions that are part of the company's retirement plan. TR 62; 120 (S. Thompson). Thus, her calling "Jason" is not consistent with her the testimony and should be regarded as such.

install. In fact, even Mr. Thompson testified that "Jason", the service representative who allegedly took the order for service at the Moxley address, had no idea that Thompson was the end user and that he resided at a different address. TR 136 (E. Thompson). Therefore, it would have been impossible for "Jason" to opine as to whether Mr. Thompson's plan was something Qwest would approve. Mr. Thompson also testified that during the alleged "Jason" conversation, he was told "if we could get service in territory, then we could run it anywhere after that." TR 66 (S. Thompson). This kind of information would be consistent with the way the Hernandez installation was completed, not with what Mr. Thompson did at the Moxley property. No one at Qwest would have said: "if you can break into Qwest's pedestal, you can run service anywhere you would like." All the Thompsons wanted was service, and they did not care how they got it. See, e.g. TR 54, 75-76; 116 (S. Thompson).

E. Qwest did not Discriminate Against the Thompsons.

The Thompsons also claim that the Hernandez installation provides a basis for a funding of discrimination. TR 91 (S. Thompson). In doing so, they compare apples and oranges. The Hernandez installation was done inside Qwest's territory on property owned by the Hernandez family. TR 363-64 (Duffy); Exhibit C-6. Mr. Thompson even testified that these installations were common during his employment with the company. TR 144 (E. Thompson). The Thompsons, however, were using property owned by another individual and managed to obtain service by breaking into Qwest's pedestal and re-wiring its lines. TR 142 (E. Thompson). To claim that Qwest's disconnection and removal of Mr. Thompson's rigged service that originated from his neighbors house amounts to discrimination is wholly without merit.

At hearing, the Thompsons also claimed that Mr. Thompson was discriminated because he was an employee of the company. TR 98-99 (E. Thompson). Specifically, the Thompsons claim that he was treated differently and in jeopardy of losing his job because,

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as a Qwest employee, he filed an informal complaint against the company while working in the Prescott area. TR 58 (S. Thompson). For example, Mr. Thompson heard through the "grapevine" that a friend who was at a party overhead others talking about the company not being happy with Mr. Thompson and that his job may be in jeopardy. TR 57 (S. Thompson); 103 (E. Thompson). Not only is this third-hand information inadmissible as hearsay, it is internally inconsistent and was not supported by any of the testimony at hearing. Mr. Thompson himself testified that he never had any problems in his 29 years at Owest, that he knew all of the employees in the Prescott area, and that they were all "good friends." TR 102-03 (E. Thompson). Another former Qwest employee who worked with Mr. Thompson during his tenure in the Prescott area testified that he never heard of anyone threatening to fire Mr. Thompson or having a "vendetta" against him. TR 494; 496 (Dougan). In fact, Qwest records indicate that Qwest went an extra step for Mr. Thompson in trying to find a way to provide him with service even when he told them that he was outside of Qwest's service territory when he placed his order. TR 390; 368 (Duffy); Exhibit R-14 (Thompson's RTT ticket). Mr. Thompson also testified that, as a union employee at the company, he was once a union steward and that he would not have hesitated to call on the union and initiate a report had he felt that he job was in jeopardy as a result of filing a complaint against the company. TR 137 (E. Thompson). None of the Thompsons' allegations, legally or factually, can form the basis for discrimination.

III. FORCING QWEST TO SERVE IN SECTION 11 IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

Where a request for initial service is at issue, the Commission must consider the best interest of the public. *James P. Paul*, 137 Ariz. at 430, 671 P.2d at 408. Where a carrier has applied to serve an area, and that carrier can provide service that is adequate and reasonably priced, it is in the public interest that the carrier be granted a certificate for the area.

A. The Commission Should Grant Midvale's Request to Serve the Complainants Section and Two Other Sections in Prescott Valley.

On January 10, 2002 Midvale applied to extend its service territory to include parts of Poquito Valley in Prescott Valley, Arizona, including Section 11, and two other Sections directly north in the Antelope Meadows area. See Docket No. T-032A-03-0017; TR 240. Staff has recommended that the Commission approve Midvale's application. See Staff's Aug. 1, 2003 Report and Recommendation. If Midvale's application is approved, it will be the incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") for the Complainants, Section 11, and two other sections, and the Complainants' request for service from Qwest will be rendered moot. See, e.g., Decision No. 64828, Bryan and Pam Dellinger v. Qwest Corporation, Docket No. T-01051B-01-0354, at 5-7.

Midvale anticipates that this particular expansion would provide wireline telecommunication services, including DSL capability, to approximately 300 parcels and 100 potential customers, the majority of which are located in Section 11. TR 237; 240 (K. Williams). Midvale testified, however, that if Qwest were ordered to serve even part of Section 11 it would "drastically" change Midvale's ability to expand into this area, thus, eliminating the possibility for wireline service to at least 100 individuals in the area. TR 271 (K. Williams). This elimination of potential wireline service for the remainder of Poquito Valley and Antelope Meadows is not in the public interest and is contrary to fostering competition in Arizona.

With regard to the Complainants specifically, Midvale's cost of providing service is also significantly lower than Qwest's cost to provide service. First, Midvale anticipates that it will apply for Federal funding to help build the necessary facilities in the area. TR 243 (K. Williams). As a result, the Complainants, and anyone else ordering service in the area, would not have to pay any up-front construction costs. *Id.* Qwest engineering

¹⁸ In this application, Midvale also applied for a certificate to serve three Sections in the Long Meadow and Crossroad Ranch areas near Prescott. TR 240 (K. Williams on behalf of Midvale).

estimates, by comparison, would require the Complainants to pay approximately \$4,100 in construction costs alone, a calculation that Staff found reasonable. See Staff's July 9, 2003 Report; TR 332-33 (Duffy). Although the rate for basic local service is higher for Qwest on a monthly basis, it would take the Complainants almost 30 years to recoup the difference between the higher monthly rate from Midvale and the up-front construction costs from Qwest. Id.

The Complainants have no problem with Midvale as their wireline provider. See e.g., TR 121 (S. Thompson); 172, 175 (T. White). They just do not want to wait longer for Midvale to install its facilities. TR 175 (T. White). Not only does the potential wait fail to form a basis for forcing Qwest to serve them, it would result in at least 97 other potential customers missing out on any opportunity to obtain wireline service for their homes. While Complainants may believe that this is in *their* interest, it is not in the *public* interest.

B. Forcing Owest to Serve Section 11 Would Divert Facilities Engineered for Anticipated Growth in Sections that are Currently Within Owest's Boundaries.

In forcing Qwest to serve the Complainants or Section 11, the Commission is setting Qwest up to fail. If Qwest is required to redirect resources from areas within its current boundary to areas outside of its boundary, the individuals living within Qwest's service territory who want service also lose. Qwest has worked hard to uphold its bargain with the Commission under the Service Quality Tariff. The Complainants are simply not part of that bargain. As Qwest made clear at hearing and throughout this proceeding, some facilities are in place near the Complainants property. TR 482 (Dougan). The Complainants live on the border of Qwest's service territory between Section 11 and Section 14. When Qwest placed facilities in this area, it engineered them specifically for Section 14 to accommodate current customers and anticipated growth of additional customers. *Id*.

As part of its obligation under the Service Quality Price Cap Tariff, among other obligations, Qwest must engineer facilities to accommodate growth so that new service can be installed within the times frames required under the Tariff. TR 312-13 (Duffy). If Qwest is unable to get service up and running within five days, it must begin crediting customers and may be subject to fines assessed by the Commission. No other provider in Arizona pays penalties for violations of a Service Quality Tariff. Qwest's improved placing and service into its service area has resulted in no penalties being assessed against it in 2002 and for the first half of 2003. TR 314 (Duffy). Diverting resources to serve Section 11 that are placed to serve Section 14 disadvantages both Qwest and its future customers in Section 14.

C. It is in the Public Interest to Resolve Issues Regarding Unserved and Underserved Areas on a Uniform, Industry-wide Basis.

The issues raised by these complaints are complex and implicate a much broader inquiry including "how best to address unserved areas that result from population growth...." See Staff's Reply Comments to Qwest's Consolidated Answer at 4 (10/18/02). Qwest agrees. In November of 2002, Qwest moved this Commission to join these other carriers in these proceedings to enable the Commission to make the specific factual and legal determination as to "which common carriers are best able to provide such services for that Unserved community" necessary in exercising its authority to force Qwest to serve outside its service area. See 47 U.S. C. § 214(e)(3). Alternatively, pursuant to A.A.C. R14-3-109(H), Qwest asked for consolidation of matter with Docket No. RT-00000H-97-137, the Arizona Universal Service Fund ("AUSF") Docket.

Consolidation of these proceedings would enable the Commission to resolve broader policy issues relevant to the complaints as well as the AUSF Docket, such as establishing whether Arizona has a specific, predictable and sufficient funding mechanism for telecommunication service to rural areas, and how to address unserved areas that result

from population growth beyond carriers' service boundaries. Most importantly, it would ensure that all such complaints are resolved in a manner consistent with other similar complaints of remote rural areas and are consistent with federal law.

Twice this Commission has opened AUSF rulemaking dockets to develop rules, policies and procedures for dealing with unserved and underserved areas. This docket has been essentially open since 1997. On September 21, 2001, the Commission re-opened that docket. Both actions were a result of specific complaints or cases whereby the Commission had faced funding issues for rural areas and was forced to make a decision on how to apply the Fund on an ad hoc basis. TR 527-528 (Staff). The September 2001 notice requested stakeholders comment on various issues relating to unserved and underserved areas. The majority of major providers, including wireless providers, filed comments. TR 529 (Staff). Nonetheless, the Commission has no current timeline for closing the docket and resolving some of the issues punctuated by these complaints. TR 530 (Staff). As a result, Qwest and other carriers who may be now or in the future similarly situated have no rules to follow in making determinations relevant to service in unserved and underserved areas.

Similarly, the Commission has opened a docket relating to Extended Area Service ("EAS"), Docket No. RT 00000J-02-0251. The purpose of this docket is to formulate rules for enabling carriers to uniformly establish processes by which they can offer toll calls to customers on an affordable basis. Likewise, the Commission has no plans for filing or promulgating these rules. Thus, each carrier is left on its own to make such determinations, and customers are left with having to pay for calls that are made across the street but not necessarily across the rest of the state.

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

While Qwest recognizes the frustration felt by the Complainants who cannot obtain wireline telephone service as quickly as they could like, Qwest consistently and uniformly

has upheld its policy to provide service to only those individuals and business entities within its designated service territory. Qwest also understands the frustration felt by the Complainants over errors that occurred when they allegedly misunderstood that service would be available to them. This was human error. While it is frustrating for the Complainants, the reality is that Qwest does order intake for over 13 million customers and potential customers each year. The mistakes made in by Qwest in Section 11 are an infinitesimal percentage of the total amount of orders taken by Qwest. This is true even if you consider the three other similar instances put before the Commission since 1995 (i.e. the *Miller*, *Walker* and *Dellinger* complaints). Even understanding some of the Complainants' frustration, they do not introduce any evidence demonstrating that Qwest discriminated against them be refusing to extend service.

The Complainants have a cellular alternative available to them now and will have a wireline provider in the near future – a provider that the Complainants testified they would have no problem using. In this world of competitive telecommunications, the FCC, Congress and the Commission have created a process intended to attract carriers to serve people, like the Complainants. In this case, that process worked, and Midvale, with its own state-of-the-art facilities, is willing to provide service to this area.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of September, 2003.

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QWEST EXAMINATION OF DEL SMITH ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION July 15, 2003

- Q. The Commission also, if I recall your testimony correctly from your deposition, has no rules or policies or procedures concerning the treatment, how the Commission would review claims of customer treatment in a discriminatory manner, correct?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. I remember us talk well, I wasn't actually at your deposition. I remember reading in your deposition about Staff's view or what it would consider particularly if somebody made a claim that they were being discriminated against, that some people were being given service in the area and other people were not, correct?
- A. I recall a specific discussion about that.

ALJ DION: Mr. Smith, do you mind speaking into the microphone? You said you did recall a discussion?

THE WITNESS: I recall there was some discussion about that, right.

BY MS. DWYER:

- Q. That's where we talked about there was no rules or policies or procedures in place for Staff to make a determination about that, correct?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. I am putting up here what has been marked and admitted I believe as Exhibit C-6, which is a map of the complainants' service areas. And I am doing that to help illustrate some of my questions maybe to you.

When we talked or when you talked about what you would look at, you said that you would look at certain factors like whether the company had extended, for example, to others in the area because the property was contiguous, for example?

Is that a yes?

A. Yes.

- Q. Okay. And, in fact, we talked about a Commission rule in place that addresses a company, a telecommunications company, extending to out of its service area to contiguous property, did we not?
- A. Yes, we did.
- Q. And that rule is Commission Rule R-14-2502, correct?
- A. I will accept that.
- Q. The rule is of record and I really don't want to make another exhibit and add to the pile of exhibits, but would it be –
- A. I know what you are talking about, if that's that is the rule that you are supposed to notify the Commission if you are serving a contiguous property.
- Q. Okay. I am not going to make it an exhibit but I am going to place it in front of you just for ease of reference.
- A. I think the issue is what the definition of continuous.
- Q. Right. So I believe what you said is the company isn't discriminating if it is authorized in some form to extend its service to contiguous property, correct?
- A. I think that is probably correct, that's correct.
- Q. The rule in fact simply requires a company to notify the Commission when it does go outside service boundary lines to do that, correct?
- A. Yes, that's correct. I guess I just to be, just to clarify, once again, I think the issue is how you define contiguous. And I am thinking in terms of my definition of what contiguous means.
- Q. Right. And you talked about your definition of contiguous. And you said contiguous means adjacent to the utility service area, the property is butted up against the service boundary, correct?
- A. That's correct.

- Q. And that a utility could make an extension out of its certificated area to a contiguous piece of property per your definition and be in compliance with the rules, correct?
- A. If it notified the Commission, that's correct.
- Q. And if the Commission, again the rule requires notification, but if the Commission saw something inappropriate going on, once it was noticed it would have the ability to take action if it wanted?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. In looking at C-6, there is a black line that runs across it horizontally that represents Qwest's service boundary. Do you see that?
- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Okay. Would this red block representing the Lehman property be contiguous, by your definition, to the service boundary area?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. Would this red block of property, if at one time it was one piece of property, which is labeled Skipper/Dunn Do you see that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. --would that be contiguous?
- A. There is this black line.
- Q. If it was. It is a hypothetical on my part, if at one time.
- A. It if were all –
- Q. -- one piece.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Yes, it would. Would this piece of property be contiguous?
- A. Yes, it would.

Q. Okay.

ALJ DION: Just for the record, that was the Hernandez property?

MS. DWYER: Yes, it was. I am sorry.

BY MS. DWYER:

- Q. I also believe you said that just because a utility may choose to extend pursuant to this rule, or it may not even choose to do it, it may happen by mistake that that does not necessarily change it boundary lines, correct?
- A. Would you say that again, please.
- Q. Yes. Maybe it helps if I point and maybe it doesn't.
 In your deposition, I believe you testified that if a utility, either intentionally or even unintentionally, by mistake, extends to a contiguous property, notifies the Commission, that does not necessarily change the boundary line, is that correct?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Because you would have a it doesn't make these properties then contiguous, is that correct?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. The company is not obligated to then extend its service boundary line upward, correct?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Because you could in effect have a problem ad infinitum, moving the boundary line up forever, correct?
- A. That's correct.

(Transcripts pages 520:2-525:8) 1460733.1/67817.307